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This essay first sets out the “business model” problems 
entailed by corruption and their effects as well as 
implications for economic growth. Key issues are the 
need for secrecy and co-operation with partners in crime. 
Dealing with these leads to behavior which is ostensibly 
bizarre and undermines economic efficiency, but is 
in fact a rational way of managing corrupt practices. 
However, different economic policies can be pursued 
that are compatible with corruption. Some are more 
pro-growth than others. Pro-growth corrupt policies 
hold the promise of enriching the corrupt elite more 
in absolute terms even though the share of national 
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wealth diverted may be smaller. The most effective pro-
growth polices that help enrich an elite resemble fairly 
orthodox economic policy prescriptions. Eventually 
the abolition of corruption holds the greatest promise 
to enhance growth and with it the wealth of elites. The 
expectation of such growth may explain why more and 
more political elites pursue “sound” economic policy and 
may embrace anti-corruption efforts, while securing legal 
ways of enrichment for themselves. Country examples 
illustrate policy approaches with different combinations 
of enrichment and growth properties.  
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In 1974 the World Bank published a prominent study: “Redistribution with Growth”.  It set out 
thinking about achieving the Holy Grail of development economics  – how to obtain overall 
growth and a better life for all at the same time.   
The developmental discourse faces two issues.  Why would powerful people heed the call of 
technocrats for policy reform when it does not explicitly aim at assuring that they come out well?  
Not only that, but standard developmental discourse has recently emphasized that corruption is a 
scourge that prevents countries from growing.  If this type of enrichment of the powerful may 
actually be at odds with technocratic policy advice, why follow the advice?   
Many people actually running bits of the world want power and wealth.  The spectacular growth 
performance of many countries across the globe has shown that traditional ways of ruling and 
robbing a country may not be very effective at reaching those goals.  How then can enrichment 
best be pursued by powerful elites? 
One might call the goal of the greedy ruler “Enrichment with Growth”.  In the following I set out 
arguments that a Consigliere to the “rich and shameless” might want to think about.  First, I 
discuss key mechanisms that characterize “traditional” corruption.  Second, I set out an approach 
to  enrichment  that  nowadays  seems  to  be  followed  by  many  autocrats  –  ownership  of 
professionally managed corporations – and its limitations.  Third, arguments are provided for a 
potentially more promising approach to enrichment, one that looks suspiciously like some forms 
of industrial policy. Fourth, the most effective form of enrichment is described – running an 
economy  like  a  portfolio  manager  with  decent  corporate  governance.    Finally,  the  paper 
concludes with perspectives on the debate about enrichment of powerful people, growth and 
legitimacy. 
 
Extracting Rents and Effects on Economic Performance  
Corruption is supposed to make the corrupt better off.  In doing so it may undermine the welfare 
of others, not just to the degree of direct stealing, but by destroying the very basis for economic 
activity.  It is, for example, utterly clear that systems of what Mancur Olson called “roving 
bandits” fail (Olson, 2000).  Competing rent-extracting “warlords” destroy the basis for wealth 
and end up with little wealth themselves compared to what can be obtained in well-functioning 
countries (see Shleifer and Vishny (1993) for a basic model).  
The warlords themselves are typically not terribly rich by the standards of today’s world and 
they are somewhat limited in enjoying the fruit of their stealing.  They might be interested in 
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developing the economy, if they can benefit in the bargain. Even in less dysfunctional systems 
corrupt elites see what is apparently possible in today’s world. Countries like China and India are 
still plagued by corruption; yet they grow extremely fast.  The ideal for the corrupt would be to 
support general economic growth in a way that allows them to make more in absolute terms.    
The basic arithmetic is simple.  Assume you want to make money off extracting wealth from a 
country. In a country with the income level of the Democratic Republic of Congo you need to 
extract 100 percent of GDP to obtain the same amount of money that extracting just 1 percent in 
a country like Korea gives you (assuming equal populations).  In Tunisia one would need to 
collect 5 percent and in Nigeria 15 percent of GDP for the purpose. All this simply reflects the 
level of income per person in the countries. 
Economic analysis has at times suggested that corruption drags down growth (see Mauro, 1995 
for an initial empirical study).  Yet, the progress of analysis has left us with the finding that it is 
hard to tell how corruption affects growth (Svensson, 2005). In particular, it is by no means clear 
that all forms of corruption are inimical to growth. There is thus hope for corrupt autocrats to 
find ways to enrich themselves even more by modernizing at the same time.   
The following discussion explores basic features of policies that may make this possible.  First, 
consider  how  the  mechanisms  corruptly  to  extract  rents  often  undermine  economic  growth.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that one feature of corruption that leads to pervasive ill-effects 
is the need for secrecy.  Corruptors would thus tend to favor projects where corruption can be 
easily hidden, but which may not be efficient.   Second, corruptors would want to enhance the 
ability to extract rents and to keep others out of the corruption racket.  Hence they would act 
against new entry and thus undermine innovation in an economy.  In the following I explore this 
line of thought further.   In doing so I use a number of anecdotes derived from my work in 
Nigeria in the 1980s and early 1990s
3.   
Let’s  start  by  considering  the  “business  model”  of  the  corrupt.    Those  who  wish  to  enrich 
themselves need to solve several problems.  They need to find partners - partners to obtain favors 
from and partners to collaborate with to obtain such favors.  They then need to monitor whether 
the partners stick to their commitments and enforce the commitments.  They need to do this 
largely without the help of formal institutions such as contracts or courts.  
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Finding partners 
Somehow the corrupt partners must find each other. To some degree the formal power structures 
in a government or corporation simplify the match-making.  It is usually well-known which 
formal positions go hand in hand with the ability to dispense favors and punish defection.  Still, 
it is not always clear whether all people in position of power are corrupt.  Also, match-making 
cannot always be done in straight-forward ways for at least residual risk of prosecution, although 
this varies, of course, with the degree of control corrupt parties have over formal institutions 
such as the police or judges.   
Here it can help to create and maintain a general atmosphere of corruption.  Paradoxically, even 
a somewhat vocal press can help make the point that corruption is widespread.  As long as the 
allegations are not too specific, sometimes outlandish and not verifiable in a court of law this 
may help prepare the terrain by biasing the people interested in doing business in the country in 
question  to  those  willing  to  be  corrupt.    To  some  degree,  therefore,  public  accusations  of 
corruption  may  in  fact  facilitate  the  establishment  of  corrupt  business  relations.    Nigeria’s 
rambunctious somewhat uncontrollable press may just have played this role.  Accusations of 
corruption abound, yet little is done and many accusations may just be fabrications – a strategy 
of disinformation.  Where everybody expects corruption, many will choose to play the game.  
Thus expectations are validated. 
That  leaves  the  issue  of  identifying  specific  individuals  with  whom  to  enter  into  corrupt 
relations.  Some form of ostentatious wealth relative to the rest of society, like an expensive 
house or car, may help signal that a particular individual might be corrupt.  At the same time the 
level  of  ostentatiousness  needs  to  be  calibrated  such  that  it  might  just  plausibly  be  due  to 
legitimate sources of income such as true business success or pre-existing family wealth
4.  
Such signals pave the way to conversations that can establish willingness “to deal”.  As in the 
case  of  gangsters  who  seek  partners  (Gambetta,  2009),  it  is  not  straightforward  to  establish 
relations of trust.  There need to be places where potential partners can meet for legitimate 
reasons and where they can gauge each other’s dispositions.  The assessment of whether to trust 
someone to be willing to commit an illegal act tends to be a drawn-out process, as potential 
partners observe a host of subtle clues about each other, before broaching the true deal directly.  
A typical setting for meeting and assessing potential partners would be at the private residence of 
important intermediaries, where streams of visitors of all types from official agencies, politics or 
businesses come and go throughout the day.  The setting is relaxed; no obvious agenda is visible 
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other than a friendly visit. Chance conversations are possible – an ideal place to meet and subtly 
explore.   
Before  a  deal  can  be  done  between  the  principals  in  a  corrupt  transaction,  they  might  use 
intermediaries  to  prepare  the  terrain.    Intermediaries  are  matchmakers.    They  know  corrupt 
people. They may have long-lasting relationships with multiple parties on both sides and are thus 
able to build trust.  In some contexts their contacts and relationships may even allow them to be 
more  stable  partners  than  changing  top  policymakers  or  changing  CEOs.    (Think  “Klaus 
Schwab” and “World Economic Forum” for a legitimate variant of matchmaking.)  The use of 
intermediaries also allows the principal some plausible deniability until the final deal is closed. 
They might get their income from fees that can look legitimate – the “consulting fee” - without 
actually participating directly in grand corruption.  In fact, intermediaries may command extra 
trust, if they stick to their normal “fee schedule” and clearly stay away from asking for a special 
cut in deals. 
Deal clinching meetings follow.  In one case, the CEO of an engineering company sought to 
meet the managing director of a large public enterprise.  After long periods of petitioning for a 
meeting and waiting, he finally was ushered into the office of the managing director, who sat in 
his chair behind the desk and faced the wall.  For four hours he remained in silence while the 
radio played.  Then he turned.  A deal was closed in the ensuing meeting
5.  At first sight such 
behavior is bizarre.  Yet, “waiting games” may serve two functions.  They select people who are 
interested to wait and thus seem sufficiently desperate for a deal.  Silence also serves to place 
pressure on the waiting party to show his hand, possibly by offering a “good deal”, thereby 
revealing willingness to enter into corrupt relations.  At the same time offering to make corrupt 
payments provides a form of compromising evidence that exposes the briber
6. 
The complex process  of match-making explains some prima facie “weird” behavior.  It also 
means  that  it  takes  time.    The  only  study  I  am  aware  of  about  the  actual  transaction  costs 
(excluding technical or legal studies) of making deals for large private infrastructure projects 
shows these costs can be substantial.  Accordingly, normal transaction costs tend to amount to 
some 3 percent of project cost, whereas in complicated environments these costs can go often to 
10 percent or more (Klein, So and Shin 1996).  The extra costs are essentially due to time wasted 
by highly paid lawyers or contractors waiting for meetings, not extra costs of writing complex 
contracts.  It is normal to argue that the time spent so inefficiently demonstrates the low capacity 
of some governments or their disorganization and lack of political direction. In fact, it may be 
that the same observable phenomena reflect rational strategies to explore the potential for corrupt 
transactions.   
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Managing corrupt relationships 
The  costs  of  establishing  corrupt  relationships  militate  against  expanding  them  too  much.  
Moreover, keeping the number of parties to a corrupt relationship limited helps managing it.  
Fewer people may be more easily monitored and they present fewer chances for whistleblowing.  
In addition, it is helpful, if it is always the same few people so that repeated interaction can limit 
the incentives to renege on agreements.  Importantly, the group of participants has an incentive 
to obtain and maintain incriminating information on the others to be able to retaliate should one 
renege.  Providing such information to each other voluntarily is actually helpful for cementing 
cohesion.  
Loyalty is important so that whistleblowing and reneging is unlikely.  Hence the use of family 
members in corruption rackets or members of the same ethnic group.  If those participating in 
corruption rackets are not very competent at doing anything but being corrupt, loyalty can be 
further  enhanced.    Those  who  have  no  promising  alternative  employment  have  lessened 
incentives to be disloyal.  
Corruption  becomes  detrimental  when  multiple  parties  ratchet  up  bribe  demands  for 
complementary services they provide such as protection from the police together with a license 
for construction or when multiple “police forces” all ask for protection money without being able 
to ensure protection from the competing police. In this case, rent-seeking will erode gains from 
corruption.  Hence it is rational to maintain de facto “fee schedules” of who needs to be paid and 
with how much.  It is also necessary to keep new entrants out and to arbitrate disputes should 
they occur. 
Allocation of funds and arbitration may be easiest, where sources of corruption (“spigots” – for 
example, rents from oil, gas and mining operations) can clearly be allocated to as few parties as 
possible.  Physical  control  over  the  source  of  corruption  provides  the  best  assurance  that 
agreements can be enforced.  We might thus expect contracts to go to areas controlled by the 
principals in a corruption racket.  The process of reaching agreement, allocating spigots and 
arbitrating disputes may lead to uneconomic delays.  The various partners in a corruption racket 
presumably do not trust each other a whole lot and might require lengthy discussion and review 
to come to a shared view.   
Grand corruption requires large amounts of money to be diverted.  To keep the number of parties 
involved limited both for reasons of enrichment by the principals and to keep the chances of 
whistleblowing down, it may be useful to go for large projects when feasible.  It may be a bit like 
the choice of beverages in places where alcohol is officially prohibited.  One then tends to find a 
disproportionate share of drinks with very high alcohol content – more bang for the buck per unit 
of smuggled merchandise. Also, by choosing large, complex contracts to let, the use of non-
standard  procurement  methods  becomes  prima  facie  reasonable  and  cost  comparisons  are 
rendered difficult (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).    8 
 
What types of activities lend themselves to grand corruption?  It is sometimes argued that it is 
monopoly businesses where lots of rents can be extracted.  However, it is not clear that this is the 
main mechanism.  Extracting rents means monitoring profit and loss statements and charging 
profit-maximizing prices.  The very information contained in comprehensive accounts that allow 
this to be done, makes it more likely that corrupt practices will be found out.  High profits or 
high prices are very visible signs that attract attention of critics.   For example, it is standard to 
argue in textbooks on infrastructure regulation that rate-of-return regulation is less likely to be 
considered illegitimate, because it seems to be better at rent extraction for the consumer than 
price cap regulation, which may lead to observable high ex-post profit, even when all-in costs 
and prices may be lower.   In reality, effective prices are typically too low in corrupt countries – 
below full cost and often even below operating costs.   Grand corruption often seems to go 
together with stealing from government funding of large projects and substandard service rather 
than high consumer prices and corporate profits.   
Low  prices  conveniently  provide  a  “developmental  narrative”  that  surrounds  projects.  Such 
narratives are a part of corrupt strategies.  The narrative remains popular even though many 
studies  suggest  that  the  distributional  effects  of  low  prices  tend  actually  to  favor  better-off 
people.    Low  prices  also  mean  that  funding  has  to  come  from  government  sources.  If  an 
infrastructure venture were dependent in full on payment by customers and funded by private 
debt markets, reasonably solid accounts would need to be maintained, which would increase the 
likelihood of finding out wrong-doing
7.   Corrupt payments may thus more easily be taken out of 
public funding, not privately paid revenues.   
Monitoring and accounting 
The discussion suggests that basic accounting is an enemy of corruption.  It also highlights that a 
measure  like  profit  exerts  relatively  tight  management  discipline,  because,  to  be  derived,  it 
requires consistent and comprehensive accounting.  Nigeria provides apposite anecdotes. In 1978 
a scandal broke for the national oil company, NNPC, facing allegations that it had diverted 
something in the order of 2.8 billion dollars.  The allegations were never proven, not least thanks 
to the inexistence of accounts for the company.  A public commission that dealt with the matter 
recommended in 1980 among other things that NNPC keep proper accounts.  Consultants were 
hired.  Yet, accounts kept being late by more than a year – unsuitable for management.  In the 
mid-1980s a fire broke out in the accounting department and set the effort back further.   The 
breaking out of fires, not in the kitchen, but in the accounting department had a good tradition in 
the country.  West Africa’s then tallest tower, the NITEL building in Lagos, stood charred for 
many years from a fire that had broken out in its accounting department.   
A  lack  of  accounts  prevents  serious  management  and  the  lack  of  control  is  acutely  felt  by 
management.  A colleague and I once developed a financial model of the Nigerian National 
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Petroleum  Corporation  (NNPC)  based  on  public  data  on  oil  production,  global  oil  prices, 
standard cost  estimates  and  cost  patterns  from  outdated  accounts  of  the  company.  The  then 
Managing Director of NNPC was so interested that he spent four hours discussing the financial 
model.  In no other case was a person at this level willing to spend that much time discussing 
substantive issues without even a hint of a deal on the table.   
While comprehensive accounts are problematic for corrupt practices, some form of monitoring is 
needed on whether bribers paid and whether bribes received their agreed share.  When IMF 
staffers once probed the fiscal accounts of Nigeria they could not reconcile numbers. When 
pressing for explanations, they were - allegedly - in the end able to see an accounting of major 
expenditures maintained at the very center of government in an exercise book.  While this is no 
way to keep professional accounts, it might be a rational method for keeping track of corrupt 
payments. Such informal accounting need not be as comprehensive as full accounts, but just 
needs to track critical payments.  It need just be used for monitoring of corrupt agreements not 
for managing a company or government finances.   
 
A Country Case: Nigeria 
What might be the overall outcome of a system that embodies the features discussed above for a 
whole country?  Consider Nigeria.  One can easily document a few striking patterns.   
First, policy-making for large projects has been extremely stable – no external shock, no shift in 
relative  prices  used to  dislodge  or reshape projects, once they were agreed.   Until  recently, 
almost all large projects were already contained as proposals in a consultant report by Arthur D. 
Little in 1964.  They progressed inexorably, albeit excruciatingly slowly at times.  The poster 
child for the syndrome is the multi-billion dollar Ajaokuta steel plant:  conceived in 1964, started 
in 1979 with outdated Soviet technology, completed in 2004, shut down again and re-opened in 
2010.  Official commission reports occasionally recommended that several projects be stopped, 
including Ajoakuta – with no effect
8.  The slow progress may reflect periodic shortage of funds, 
shift in parts of the economics and also hold-ups by important players in the system.  The Bonny 
LNG project provides a case in point.  In 1964 a plane with buyers willing to sign  off-take 
agreements for the gas was on the tarmac in Amsterdam ready to fly to Lagos.  Yet, the then 
petroleum commissioner from the North of the country stopped the process and ordered a 
review, during which time North Sea oil was discovered. This killed the economics of the project 
for many years.  It was not until 1999 that the plant became operational.  The development of 
large  infrastructure  projects  followed  similar  patterns.    For  example,  hydro -power  plants 
continued on course, even though gas would have been cheaper (Klein, 1987). 
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Second, the key players in the system have remained in important positions for very long periods 
of time.  To this day candidates for top political positions are old-timers, such as Muhammadu 
Buhari, author of the 1983 military coup, running for President in 2011
9.  George Obiozor of the 
Nigerian  Institute of International Affairs once called Nigerian politics  “a  game  of  rocking 
chairs, a game in which unlike in the game of musical chairs, there is no movement”.
10 This is at 
odds with a country often depicted as rocked by coups and erratic political change.  Yet, it may 
be that elites at the top rotate, while the underlying power structure remains little changed.  
Third,  large,  complex  projects  were  distributed  across  the  major  parts  of  the  country,  for 
example, one refinery in the East at Port Harcourt, one in the West at Warri and finally one in the 
North at Kaduna, some 800 km from the nearest port. Roughly this corresponds to the territories 
of the three main ethnic groups of the country, the Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo. Early on in 1962 the 
approach  was  to  provide  different  regions  of  the country  with  equity  shares  in  refineries  in 
economically efficient locations.  However, this proved not to be a stable solution politically. The 
results were bizarre projects. The Kaduna refinery was designed to produce specialty products 
that others did not produce, including asphalt for road construction.  The refinery was built.  
Then the country had to import heavy oil to obtain the desired product slate via roughly 800 km 
of oil pipelines. When asphalt was finally produced the government ran out of money following 
the decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s.  The response was to try exporting asphalt by rail back 
to the port ostensibly to obtain valuable foreign exchange. It was like buying a house knocking it 
down and selling the parts. 
Fourth,  as  the  system  is  focused  on  extracting  rents  from  funding  of  complex  construction 
projects and undermines management capabilities and incentives, it may easily lead to provision 
of poor quality services. Whereas proper accounting allows one comprehensively to “follow the 
money”, the causes of substandard quality are harder to pin down.  For example, officials in 
Nigeria almost reflexively blame suppliers for sub-standard quality of equipment or construction 
regardless of the real reason.  They might be right, they might not be.  One cannot easily find 
out.  Funds for maintenance are lacking.  Operations by local staff in government firms have 
often been deficient.  The country is full of private fallback solutions for deficient infrastructure 
services like standby generation or private water vendors. 
Finally,  the  various  arrangements  that  make  corruption  manageable  provide  a  rational 
explanation  for  often  observed  uneconomic  decision-making,  weak  “capacity”  and  the  like.  
Reviews  of Nigerian policies  by the  country itself have routinely come  out  with  views that 
“priorities  are  not  properly  defined,  planning  seems  to  be  synonymous  with  aggregation  of 
projects, and coordination by government departments is poor”.  This particular assessment was 
made for NNPC by a managing director.  Hence, top managers understand the issues.  At the 
same time Nigerian staff performs effectively in different settings, for example, in the private oil 
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companies in the country.  Key managers of NNPC were in fact drawn from the private oil 
companies.  Yet, capable and rational people have a hard time operating effectively in a system 
that militates against sound management information, that tries to limit people in the know, 
compartmentalizes information and may promote staff into key position who are loyal and not so 
competent
11.   
As a result, possibly of a corruption driven syndrome, project choices have been uneconomic, 
massive  delays abound,  operations have been inefficient   and service quality has been sub -
standard.  Critical inputs for the economy as a whole were either not provided  at all or in sub-
standard quality.   Funds syphoned off have been of significant amounts and pres umably been 
spent abroad to an important extent.   
 
Improving the Corrupt Business Model 
Running a traditional corruption system is possible but it undermines economic growth.  Bad 
projects are chosen.  Quality of service is reduced.  Sound management is undermined. To up the 
game, new forms of enrichment are needed.  Many powerful people dream of making their 
country richer, more “competitive”. They send their children to be educated at Harvard.  They 
seek medical treatment in Singapore. They know that, if there was higher productivity growth in 
their economy, there could be so much more wealth going around, including for themselves.     
The basic challenges in establishing an effective system of corruption remain.  Partnerships have 
to be formed.  Agreements have to be monitored and enforced, all this without the explicit help 
of official institutions and with at least plausible deniability.  The challenges do not become 
easier  if  one  seeks  a  more  efficient  system.    Better  project  choices  are  needed  as  is  better 
management.  It means monitoring will be easier and secrecy harder to maintain.  Yet, corrupt 
elites the world over are ready to embrace the challenge. 
So what would the strategy of powerful people look like, if they wanted to combine enrichment 
with better growth?  Somehow they need to be directly interested in generating growth.  This 
requires  waiting  until  efficient  projects  produce  profit  derived  from  productivity growth.    It 
means preventing others from breaking ranks and from stealing upfront in ways that undermine 
the achievement of productivity growth.  Andrew Wedeman (1997) has called this the search for 
“dividend-collecting” systems of corruption.  
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Ownership of Corporations 
One  thing  about  economic  growth  seems  clear.    One  needs  to  have  dynamic  firms  with 
professional management.  Compared to the previous discussion of a corrupt business model, the 
corrupt need to surround themselves not just with people who are loyal, but also competent and 
thus  with  outside  options.    Professional  managers  may  jump  ship  when  they  see  dubious 
behavior or they have the potential to apply their competence to feather their own nest to the 
detriment  of  the  corrupt  “principal”.    This  places  a  special  burden  on  supervision  of  the 
professional by parties loyal to the principal, for example by family members of the principal.  
The number of suitable family members or otherwise close associates limits the manageable 
control span and thus the size of firms.  Supervision might also fail, because the supervisor might 
not  be  able  to  understand  enough  of  what  managers  are  actually  doing.    Hence  it  becomes 
particularly important to obtain and keep incriminating evidence on them.  Infractions like tax 
evasion, evasion of regulatory requirements or other personal dirt come in helpful to build an 
incriminating dossier.   
The challenges of hiding corrupt activities become more “market-oriented”. At one level they 
become easier.  Once a corrupt principal has gained ownership of a firm, he has a legal right to 
derive  benefits  from  it.    Much  effort  thus  goes  into  acquiring  or  disposing  of  assets  by 
manipulating valuation.  For example, the acquisition of ownership rights and the purchase or 
sale  of  other  assets  is  preferably  conducted  through  negotiation  rather  than  some  form  of 
effective  auction.    This  provides  one  explanation  for  the  popularity  among  politicians  of 
negotiated  deals  for  privatization  or,  for  example,  large  infrastructure  contracts  such  as 
Independent  Power  Providers.  Disguising  beneficial  ownership  can  help  obscure  the  matter 
further.  Other such time-honored ways of bad corporate governance can also be used for stealing 
such as using related party transactions for “tunneling”.  
Trying ones hand at owning corporations has become very popular for important political leaders 
in many countries.  It has been tried with varying success by leaders across the world. Control of 
business empires is often exercised by family members, who might provide a degree of loyalty. 
Elsewhere the ruling party may play that role.  Famous examples are Suharto or the King of 
Morocco. Businesses in Indonesia with connections to Suharto suffered systematic share price 
losses  in  response  to  news  of  Suharto’s  health  (Fisman,  2001).  In  the  transition  to  market 
economies, leaders in countries of the former Soviet Union or in China or currently in Africa 
promote the move to more market-oriented systems while obtaining ownership rights in new 
fully or partly private companies.  
A bit of emphasis on firms and professional management has provided some promising results – 
compare Nigeria and Indonesia.  Yet, the recent troubles in Tunisia exemplify some of the limits 
of  the  approach.    Important  enterprises  in  the  country were  controlled  by the family  of  the 
deposed ruler, Ben Ali.  Tunisia did well economically relative to other countries in the region 
that  do  not  benefit  from  oil.    However,  growth  remained  modest.  While  the  country  had 13 
 
improved its policies, the heavy hand of government remained palpable for all who wanted to do 
business, from street vendors to larger players attempting to enter markets.  
The essential limitation of the “corporate model of corruption” is its attitude to entry and exit.  
The  ruling  elite,  once  transformed  into  owners,  likes  keeping  competition  out  (Shleifer  and 
Vishny, 1993).  For growth to be more dramatic and to be sustained, the forces of creative 
destruction need to be allowed to play.  It is then not clear that firms owned by powerful people 
will survive and with them the rents they were meant to provide.  
 
Sharing in Portfolios of Firms  
It seems that it is not enough to invest in a firm and try the professional way.  If one also needs to 
pursue competition, the Holy Grail for a greedy ruler would be to “invest” in a portfolio of 
companies  in  a  dynamic  economy.    Still  corrupt  people  need  to  obfuscate  information  and 
maintain discipline in the system.   
Assuming that a solution exists, what might some features look like ex post?  It seems plausible 
to expect that a country that found a successful “portfolio approach” to corruption does not 
possess significant natural resources.  There would then not have been the easy option to steal 
resource  rents.  Instead,  the  only  way  of  generating  rents  would  have  been  via  productivity 
growth. 
The  core  corrupt  system  itself  might  consist  of  a  limited  number  of  powerful  players  with 
restricted entry into the system. At the same time there needs to be a market that selects good 
performers  from  bad  ones.    The  measurement  of  success  in  that  market  needs  to  be 
compartmentalized so as to make it hard to trace money flows.   
Imagine you create some large conglomerates and limit competition at home. Then tell them that 
favors depend on success in export markets.  Such success tends to reflect productivity growth 
thus creating gains that can be distributed among the corrupt.  Monitoring export success can be 
done independent of keeping good accounts.  Export numbers are partial indicators of financial 
performance,  but  de  facto  often  correlated  with  success.    They  can  also  be  cross-checked 
relatively easily by looking at import numbers abroad.   
To maintain discipline the interplay between taxation, regulation and firms provides means for 
hostage taking. First, higher taxes or complex regulations may make it more tempting to avoid 
them and thus provide fodder for incriminating dossiers.  At the same time compliant firms may 
easily be able to avoid trouble with the law and thus not be unduly hindered as long as they 
“behave”.  Second, in return for taxes and favors authorities may provide firms with benefits - 
subsidies of some form. Alternatively, one could just extract the net difference between taxes and 
favors on the one hand and subsidies on the other.  However, asking for higher taxes with the 14 
 
option of paying some back in the form of subsidies is a way of taking “hostages” to enforce 
corrupt agreements. If one also controls the banks and allows numbered bank accounts one has a 
way of moving money in ways that are hard to trace. 
These  various  features  are  what  one  used  to  observe  ex  post  in  Korea.  The  government 
aggressively  promoted  the  Chaebols,  Korean  conglomerates,  under  Park  Chung-Hee  in  the 
1960s.  Business associations helped manage state-business collaboration.  Initially, the goal was 
a “self-reliant” import-substituting economy under state control.  Control was exercise through 
the banking system via preferential terms for credit. Even when banks were formally private, 
managers were appointed by the government.  The use of anonymous accounts in banks was 
allowed. Accounting in Chaebols allowed detailed money flows to be obscured. A critical later 
innovation  by  the  Park  regime  was  that  favors  were  provided  to  the  Chaebol,  only  if  they 
performed in export markets and paid unofficial political contributions (You, 2005).  This set up 
a contest that provided incentives for the Chaebol to raise productivity (Stiglitz, 1996).  
“Cultivating good relationships with the President became a golden road for business expansion” 
(You, 2005).  The good relationships were punctuated by occasional prosecution of business 
owners or politicians for tax evasion or corruption, with cases typically dropped later, possibly 
because the desired disciplinary effect had been achieved.  In one case the owner of Samhak, one 
of the largest conglomerates in the late 1960s, supported the opposition candidate Kim Dae-Jung 
in  the  1971  election.    He  was  convicted  of  tax  evasion  and  the  conglomerate  forced  into 
bankruptcy.  
The outcome was spectacular economic growth and probably rising amounts of corruption in 
absolute  terms  till  the  early  1990s  (based  on  data  on  actual  corrupt  payments  culled  from 
newspaper reports and trials – see You, 2005).   
One might thus potentially interpret Korean industrial policy not just as a clever technocratic 
response to market failure, but also as a device to allow corruption to function in a system that 
generates productivity growth.  Shleifer and Vishny (1993) pointed out that the Korea case was a 
puzzle.  Maybe the design of “industrial policy” holds the key to the answer. 
Yet,  even  the  “Korean  Model”  has  limitations.    During  the  Asian  crises  of  the  late  1990s 
problems  of  corporate  governance  were  prominently  displayed.    The  structure  of  corporate 
arrangements  placed  minority  shareholders  at  risk.    Problematic  financial  practices  such  as 
excessive leverage came to haunt corporations.  The large corporations were hard to understand 
and difficult to control and restructure.  Close ties to politics may have exacerbated excessive 
risk-taking in the hope of political support in case of trouble.  Limited transparency has been a 
legacy of the past.  In addition, one of the macro-economic outcomes of exposing corporations to 
competition in export markets, while protecting them at home, is a dualistic structure of the 
economy – world class corporations honed in global competition live side by side with low-
productivity companies catering to a protected domestic market, just like in Japan. 15 
 
How to do better then?  What would be needed is an approach that provides for participation of 
the  elite  in  a  well-diversified  portfolio  of  corporations  that  are  exposed  to  competition  and 
governed in a professional manner.  To prevent professional managers abusing their control over 
corporations, effective corporate governance would need to protect shareholders.  All the while 
the ruling elite would ensure that there be a policy environment that enables business to function 
well.    The  destructive  features  of  traditional  corruption  would  need  to  be  eliminated.    The 
remuneration of the elite would need to come from profits of the portfolio of companies.  To be 
able to maintain control over the system, a level of state ownership of critical players in the 
system, such as critical holding companies, would be useful.  State ownership provides extra 
discretion to elites to assign positions and rights to income from firms and to discipline those 
breaking rank. 
These requirements are met, for example, by Singapore.  The economy is organized around large 
state companies that act as holding companies for a range of businesses. Temasek holdings is 
renowned  for  its  professional  competence  and  invests  in  a  global  portfolio  –  the  ultimate 
portfolio for sustained enrichment. Former government ministers, top civil servants and their 
families  benefit,  holding  well-paid  positions  in  these  companies.    Government  ministers  are 
among the highest paid in the world.  The prime minister earned US$ 2.9 million last year and 
awarded himself an 8 months bonus.  Singapore has one of the best business environments in the 
world.  Corruption has been tackled effectively.  Corporate governance standards are high.  At 
the same time income distribution in Singapore is among the more unequal in the world. 
 
Corruption and the End of History 
In the literature on corruption there is a debate about whether corruption (or lack thereof) drives 
economic  growth  or  whether  the  level  of  economic  development  (or  lack  thereof)  drives 
corruption.    The  arguments  of  this  paper  suggest  that  corruption  can  drag  down  economic 
performance significantly.  The expectation of economic growth can, however, change the form 
that corruption takes.  The corrupt have incentives to adopt growth-oriented policies. Indeed 
growth seems compatible with some forms of corruption and that sort of growth need not lead to 
lower absolute enrichment of elites. In the process legal forms of enrichment supplant illegal 
ones.  Yet, the distribution of positions of power remains a murky area.  
Switching enrichment regimes requires policy shifts.  Policies like privatization or public-private 
partnerships can be part of the transitions from one regime to another. So can industrial policy.  
In normal technocratic discourse, the respective proponents of privatization on the one hand and 
industrial policy on the other tend to be considered to lie on opposing sides of the ideological 
spectrum.  From the perspective of elites in search of riches both recipes may come in handy.  
Making the switch to more “productive enrichment” regimes can be hard.  For example, political 
scientists have argued that land owners in the Philippines have prevented reforms that occurred 16 
 
in countries with effective land reforms like Korea and Taiwan, China (You, 2005).  Failure to 
switch regimes provides a possible reason why some countries get trapped at particular income 
levels, not just “poverty traps”, but also middle income traps for countries like Tunisia.  This is a 
variant of the arguments used by Mancur Olson who argued that initially successful systems may 
ossify, when interest groups prevent further desirable regime change including through “state 
capture” by influential businesses.  
Ultimately,  the  debate  is  about  “using  positions  of  power  to  extract  rent”.  Sometimes  this 
involves  illegal  abuse  of  a  public  position  for  private  gain,  commonly  called  corruption.  
Sometimes this involves legal arrangements that happen to favor an elite
12.   
Wealth creation is enhanced when people are rewarded on merit and not by virtue of a position 
of power they may happen to h old.  Yet, the interest in maintai ning position may undermine 
wealth creation.  The ultimate requirement for wealth creation is allocating positions of power 
based on merit. Some rulers like Deng Xiao Ping and Lee Kuan Yew saw the need to step back 
and promote at least a modicum of merit-based succession.   
In the end, less personal ways of arranging for succession may turn out to be more effective.  
Democratic elections are a way to do so.  Just like competition in markets, elections allow for 
challenge from new promising ideas and for an end to failed approaches.  The process itself 
helps create legitimacy.  Things can still go wrong, but at least one no longer needs to rely on the 
wisdom of powerful rulers.  
Just recently, in several elections during 2011 Singaporeans sent an unexpectedly strong message 
of distrust to the ruling party.   Stellar economic performance has not been enough it seems.  
From the perspective of an advisor to the powerful, Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of the “End of 
History”  remains  relevant.  As  long  as  different  jurisdictions  race  each  other  in  search  for 
“competitiveness”  or  productivity  growth,  democracy  may  find  some  unexpected  allies. 
Democracy not only provides citizens with greater freedom, but may ultimately also be the most 




   
                                                 
12 I encountered an amusing, albeit damaging, example in Greece a few years before the current financial crisis.  The 
government of the day tried to reform business registration for small and medium firms.  In most countries this type 
of reform is popular and relatively easy to implement – not in Greece.  The complex Greek registration system 
required a series of steps with fees being paid for several.  The fees went to fund the pension fund of lawyers in 
Greece.  Hence change was impossible.  In substance the difference between unofficial and illegal “fee schedules” 
for bribes may be small. 17 
 
Concluding Remarks 
First,  this  review  of  types  of  corruption  suggests  that  a  variety  of  weird  forms  of  behavior 
observed in struggling economies may in fact be perfectly rational ways to behave for the elites 
seeking enrichment.  By the same token an apparent “lack of capacity” may be a part of rational 
strategy for the corrupt. 
Second, corruption can be detrimental for economic welfare.  Yet, different types of enrichment 
systems exist.  Some allow elites to do very well by lifting all boats.   
Third, it is not just that different systems of corruption exist. The argument of this essay suggests 
that the very experience of rapid, historically unprecedented growth is motivating elites to seek 
new ways of enrichment that can actually lead to a better life for all.  Call it economic revolution 
from above.   
Fourth, ultimately the highest degree of wealth may be reached when people obtain their position 
in  society on the basis of  merit.  Choosing  elites well is part of the issue.  The  search  for 
enrichment is one part of the forces driving towards elections of rulers. 
Fifth, once upon a time, when elites had accepted rights to the spoils of the land, enrichment was 
not “abuse” in a legal sense. The emergence of less personal systems of rule subject to the rule of 
law “forced” rapacious elites to resort to corruption, the abuse of position for personal gain. The 
forms of enrichment that seem most effective today again allow the elites to obtain their wealth 
legally,  even  though  the  acquisition,  for  example,  of  property  rights  may  have  occurred 
illegitimately.  Proudhon’s dictum that “property is theft” might apply in such cases. 
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